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Abstract 
Heathrow’s Terminal Five presents a case study in risk management that shows the 
importance of understanding and incorporating the behavioural and perception 
aspects of risk. At the outset of the project, risk was conceived technically, its 
management was sequentially driven and problems met with linear solutions. The 
case study follows a change in perspective experienced by the Terminal Five project 
teams alerting the project to important, but previously ignored, aspects of risk. This 
change required different ways of conceiving problem, and the paper describes how 
this can be done using a typology of: ‘tame’, ‘wicked’ and ‘messy’ problems. This 
requires risk managers to identify project stakeholders and seek resolutions between 
their varying perspectives, as much as deliver singular, optimal solutions. Typically, 
because wicked and messy problems cannot be modelled, they have been ignored, so 
undermining the ability of the project team to control the project effectively. This 
case study shows how risk management can embrace behavioural and systems 
complexity without undermining either clarity of information or control of project 
processes. 
Keywords: risk management; Heathrow’s Terminal Five 
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Introduction: Organizational control and strategic risk management 
Typically, risk managers determine where uncertainty exists in an organization’s 
activity, and then design preventative and contingency measures. The uncertainties 
are broken down into stages and, where it exists, information is allocated to each 
stage in order to identify the cause of the uncertainty and the possible remedial 
solutions. Placing the stages in sequence builds up an image of the risk that is then 
weighted according to the likelihood of its occurring and its possible impacts should 
it occur. By analysing this typical risk management activity on Terminal Five at 
London’s Heathrow Airport, the paper argues that this linear perspective adopted by 
many existing risk management practices can preclude consideration of the 
uncertainties arising from the need for systems and knowledge integration and from 
human behaviour. This is because systems complexity and unpredictable behaviour 
are not amenable to the rigid classificatory breakdowns and the iterative generation 
of optimal solutions that risk management theory tends to impose upon problems of 
uncertainty. It is not so much a question of widening the scope of existing risk 
analyses, as supplementing them with a different type of analysis that does not rely 
upon the use quantified proxies. In the Terminal Five case study, the introduction of 
a wider remit for the risk management team half way through the pre-project 
feasibility work meant that active consideration was given to the risks associated 
with project team ‘skills’ integration, stakeholder involvement and communication 
channels as well to the ‘technical’ risks of finance and product function. Because of 
this, it became apparent to senior management that the severity of the risks 
associated with poor communication amongst different project experts (from 
different organizational cultures) were potentially as damaging as those associated 
with product failure, were more likely to occur, and yet, potentially, were easier to 
resolve were appropriate structures put in place. One response was to stipulate that 
project teams should aver from isolating a specific response to a specific component 
of a problem until the ‘last responsible moment’, preferring instead to work across a 
range of possible solutions each argued for from different perspectives. The 
involvement of many, and often conflicting stakeholders in the consultation process 
for Terminal Five planning brought to bear such differing norms as to preclude the 
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possibility of there being any ‘right answer’ or clear path of resolution to the many 
ethical, community and perceptual ‘conflicts’ and confusions.  
The paper is asking significant practical questions of risk management. A concern for 
systems interdependency (such as: different organizations within project teams, 
infrastructure links, environmental ‘footprints’) and behavioural influences (such as 
anxiety, precautionary bias and ethical perceptions), allows projects to use risk 
management to build up decisiona l matrices that can identify dynamic efficiencies 
made possible through the management of knowledge (information linked to 
employee and customer expectations and enhanced delivery) (Nonaka et al, 1998). 
The realization of these efficiencies relies upon the initiative, skill and commitment 
of personnel to envisage and exploit risks as new opportunities (Roos, et al1997). At 
the organizational level this requires a strategy of constant and constructively self-
critical awareness and evaluation of the structures and often unconscious ‘defenses’ 
adopted by managers (Argyris, 1995). At the personnel level it requires a revision of 
expectations: no longer are employees paid to do what they are told, but encouraged 
to proffer solutions through an awareness of their contribution to the project’s and 
organization’s aims (Ghosal et al, 1999) As organizational control is becoming less 
certain and predictable and increasingly dependent upon external resources (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978) the management of uncertainties contained as ‘risks’ is 
becoming more relevant. It is the potential of risk management to manage the 
cognitive complexity of interdependent structures constituting organizations in 
networks of relations along with the cognitive plurality of knowledge, skills and 
expectations amongst its employees (Glynn, 2000) that this paper investigates.  
The typical aspects of risk 
By analysing the likelihood of something happening and the array of possible 
impacts of its happening, organizations are able to translate random uncertainties into 
probable events, or risks. These can be incorporated into organizational strategy as: 
the resources an organization has at its disposal and is likely to need, the systems it 
has in operation to implement decisions and deliver goods and services, and the 
expectations of its employees, customers and wider stakeholders. Using an example 
such as Terminal Five, such a risk analysis can take place at a number of different 
levels and from a number of different perspectives: 
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Table 1: Potential areas of risk within a project environment 
 Organization Project Team Personal 
Cultural Conflicting strategic 
aims within joint 
venture 
Personnel within 
organizational 
‘silos’  
Multi-tasking team 
with differing 
competencies   
Impact of work 
upon family 
Social Electoral change Protestor and/or 
security sensitivity 
Accountability to  
other teams 
Aligning activity 
with personal 
ethics 
Temporal New technology 
speeding up industry 
‘clockspeed’ 
Unspecified client 
need meaning 
unclear critical 
path 
Unrealistic  project 
‘milestones’ 
How activity 
promotes/hinders 
career path 
Environmental Exhaustion of non-
renewable raw 
material 
Contaminated site Pollution requires 
use of unfamiliar 
protective gear 
Exposure to 
hazards  
Financial Currency or interest 
fluctuation 
Client budget 
changes 
Underestimate 
consumables 
Salary/benefits 
Physical Poor offices weaken 
public image 
Untidy site Team split between 
site and office  
Health 
Technical Errant auditing 
system 
Lack of modular, 
pre-assembly 
suppliers 
Faulty machinery Failure to link 
competencies with 
tasks 
Facing this complexity, organizations typically use a variety of tools. Engineering 
estimates are used for property exposures, leading to figures for maximum 
foreseeable loss and probable maximum loss, coupled to actuarial projections for 
calculating expected loss levels where sufficient loss data is available. Loss and 
product/service liability are met using insurance systems linked to policies of risk 
netting (insuring distinct risks such as product liability and fire with a sole insurer to 
offset one against the other – a fire in a factory should reduce liability premiums on 
the products that would have been made there) (Meulbroek, 2001). Scenario analyses 
and Monte Carlo simulations are used to create predictive models when existing data 
is thin. For environmental uncertainties such as toxicity and pollution levels, 
probability tests are used under the aegis of the precaution principle (the onus of 
proof rests with those advocating change). Political and social risk analysis is dealt 
with using ‘Delphic’ analysis whereby experts’ opinions are tabulated, cross-
referenced and ‘stacked’. Financial risks are calculated using probability 
distributions of net present value linked to policies of risk spreading (minimising 
exposure to risk by spreading the bearing of risk amongst many investors) and risk 
pooling (involvement in a series uncorrelated projects and activities) (Klein, 2000) 
Being solution lead, these tools err toward the technical and quantifiable risks; the 
problems are seen as having an optimal solution arrived at through persistent and 
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careful analysis of the sub-problems from which they are made up, linked to requisite 
changes in business activity. Such problems can be called ‘tame’. Seeing problems as 
tame helps clarify decision-making. Experts are able to reassure decision takers of 
any likely consequences using linear, solution driven frameworks with clear modes 
of appropriate response. By keeping the class of problems tightly defined, risks can 
be priced us ing alternative discount rates and tolerability thresholds (Hoffman, 
2000).  They can then be managed using sequential layers of decision making 
(hedging, transferring, pooling, transforming) that aim to reduce unmanaged risk to a 
residual core (Millar and Lessard, 2001).    
This selectivity, however, can complicate the risk picture as much as it clarifies it. 
Firstly, whilst these models do reflect a significant reality (or set of realities), they do 
not reflect how those significant realities and those presenting them (experts) can be 
interpreted and perceived by others. For example, whilst an environmental risk can 
be shown to be almost non-existent, its heightened perception amongst wider 
stakeholders can have a major influence on project events. Secondly, they do not 
easily convey the judgmental and structural assumptions influencing the choice of 
risk focus. A dominating budget structure, for example, may mean funds for risk 
assessments are only available up to the year-end, meaning risk assessment results 
are skewed by a contingent factor of annuality. Thirdly, they do not present all 
possible realities, leaving risks uncovered (Elkington and Smallman, 2002), ignoring, 
very often, the influence of the cultural, social and temporal aspects of uncertainty 
because of a failure to consult ‘interested’ parties. Even in technical and financial 
areas, where mature modelling techniques allow determined parameters and 
sequential processes to shape organizational decisions, rapid exogenous changes to 
resource leve ls and market and client expectations can make these obsolete. 
Information, here, as anywhere, is always asymmetric Chacko et al, 2001) 
A pertinent example of these influences for the case study was a tunnel collapse at 
Heathrow in 1994 during the extension of a tube line. The subsequent Health and 
Safety Executive Report (2000) concluded that to fully understand risks “it is 
essential that organizational and human factors be taken into account”. The report 
stated that in the instance of the tunnel collapse these included: misunderstandings 
arising from contractual relationships, role ambiguity of personnel, poor 
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communication between project processes and people, the effects of production 
pressure on decision making and a cultural commitment to safety. Reading into these 
conclusions, the tunnelling uncertainties had been reduced to a series of tame 
problems and tried and tested processes put in place to identify and eliminate and/or 
control the risks. Whilst there were technical problems such as tunnel wall thickness, 
where these remained unidentified was less because of a breakdown in tried and 
tested technical assessments than because of poor interaction between contracting 
parties. The breakdown was in the information flow between organizations and in the 
unclear role responsibilities and expectations or project personnel. The implication is 
that the identification, estimation and evaluation of probabilities of occurrence and 
the likelihood of impacts is influenced by the risks of management (mis or mal-
aligned behaviours, perceptions and systems) as much as it describes the 
management of risks.    
Looking at risk differently 
Systems interdependency and ‘messes’ 
Uncertainty tends to be explained by analysing the probability of root causes or sets 
of root causes (Perrow, 1984). Often, though, it is the isolation of root cause that 
contributes to, as much alleviates, the uncertainties being explained. Isolating 
‘operator errors’ as a source for system failure on a production line, for example, can 
serve both as an indication of, and a trigger for, much deeper problems. The response 
to operator error might be to increasing surveillance. This will ensure workers attend 
to their tasks with greater concentration, reduce the uncertainty of downtime and so 
increase productivity (Scarborough and Terry, 1998). It, however, also increases the 
production system's overall complexity and so dependency upon other systems. 
Charles Perrow (1994) says this systems’ growth can itself become an actual source 
of risk because systems can develop their own conditions and behaviours that are 
often impossible to predict. For example, the needs of the surveillance system can 
predominate over the production process itself, draining resources and eroding 
profitability, thus exposing a project to the greater financial risk of higher gearing. 
Moreover, any prediction of failure that the surveillance makes possible can only 
operate in the very short run, and only at the boundaries to a problem (Thiétart and 
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Forgues, 1997). The surveillance may correct one form of ‘deviant activity’, only to 
displace the deviance elsewhere to re-emerge in another non-surveyed form. 
These problems of interdependency can be described as messes (Rittel and Weber, 
1973). A mess refers to the coupling of systems components and systems themselves, 
requiring risk management be aware of far more parameters than just a single 
component of a processes or series of such. 
Human behaviour and wicked problems 
Judgements, perceptions and anxieties all influence uncertainties in organizational 
decision-making and activity and yet, being difficult to identify in terms of effect and 
influence, are often excluded from risk management. To continue with the example 
of increasing surveillance to prevent operator error, but from a behavioural 
perspective, there are, again, risks consequent upon its adoption. Employees could 
construe it as a lack of trust in their ability, causing both passive active (absenteeism, 
day dreaming) or active resistance (withdraw labour, disrupt production) (Storey, 
1985). Equally, people often behave in line with the way that they are treated. Using 
surveillance impresses upon employees the expectation of a rigid, repetitious task 
structure (Jaques, 1996). This enforced predictability, however, can itself promote 
uncertainty because changing resource and expectation levels and equipment failures 
mean more than rigid repetition is sometimes required. 
The uncertainties arising from human behaviour can be called wicked problems 
(Rittel and Weber, 1973; Ackoff, 1974). They describe how uncertainties emerge or 
evolve without ever lending themselves to a definitive description or resolution. 
In neither the case of messes nor wicked problems is there a single, correct answer, 
and when both combine as above to form a ‘wicked mess’, risk management must 
look less to solve problems than to resolve tensions and realise satisfactory 
outcomes, fully cognisant of their being sub-optimal. This is ‘satisficing’, the 
acceptance that the problem-solving process ends when you run out of time, money, 
energy, or some other resource, not when some perfect solution emerges (Simon, 
1990). Wicked messes are puzzles; rather than solving them, risk management can 
resolve their complexities by delineating specific time periods and resource 
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allocations for decisions, or, dissolve them through clearer discourse (Thurow, 
1980). 
 
Figure 1: A project risk problem matrix  
 
 
 
Wicked 
problems  
-worker unrest 
-lack of team 
building  
 
Messes  
-IT invoicing 
breakdown 
-client 
variations 
   
Tame  
-auditing 
malfunction 
-interest rate 
change 
Wicked 
messes  
-site pollution/  
archaeology  
- protestors 
 
high 
low 
high low 
Number of 
stakeholders 
Number. of systems   
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The matrix provides an overview of how risk management can identify and structure 
the differing qualities of a range of uncertainties that might be experienced on a 
project. The further to the top right, the greater the need for ‘satisficing strategies’ to 
enable the project to deliver on its aims. For example, the financial risk of rapid 
changes in interest rates might be considered a tame problem with established 
sequential responses. The risk of high profile, and possibly violent, protestor activity 
conducted both on site and through the media might be seen as a wicked mess, 
requiring the rapid introduction of consultation groups as well as security and safety 
measures.            
The following case study reflects how changing the perspective of risk management 
from a consideration of just tame problems understood probabilistically, to ‘tame’, 
‘messy’, and wicked problems, understood as without optimal solutions (Pender, 
2001) enables a much more comprehensive and strategically focussed risk 
management to come to the fore. 
Heathrow’s Terminal Five 
Background  
Terminal Five will be built to the western end of Heathrow Airport between the two 
main runways on land now mostly occupied by the Perry Oaks sludge works within 
the regional boroughs of Hillingdon, Spelthorne and Hounslow. It was in planning 
for six years, and is to be followed by a six year capital works programme, due to 
start in spring 2002, consisting of terminal space, offices, car parks, rail and bus 
links, accommodation, retail space and service areas. Most of the development site is 
within the Green Belt, meaning any construction has to be shown to planners to be of 
an exceptional need. Terminal Five, then, is much more than a building. It is a highly 
complex transport interchange with two major (BA and BAA) and many minor 
stakeholders (UK Government, local authorities, Thames Water, Highways Agency, 
other airlines, Railways Inspectorate, Civil Aviation Authority, Fire Brigade, 
environmentalists, passengers etc..), all of whom have often conflicting objectives to 
be satisfied by the facility solution. The programme and construction costs 
unmanaged, could easily cause either BA or BAA to become ‘bankrupt’ and 
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customers (airlines or passengers), unsatisfied with the service provided, could easily 
shift to other airports. 
The risk workshops 
The risk workshops took place four years apart, the first beginning in 1996, the 
second in 2000. The research analyses this change by examining the risk registers, 
along with the perceptions of the risk facilitators conducting the workshops, one of 
whom is one of the authors.   
The 1996 risk workshop 
The workshop brief was to produce a full identification and assessment of project 
risks with the full backing and commitment of those holding the ‘key interests’ and 
responsibilities to the project i.e. the key stakeholders, as well as to comply with risk 
management legislation. The workshop was designed to identify critical risks and 
then allocate the requisite and available project competencies to the management of 
these risks. The participants were based on the considered importance to the project 
and were chosen largely from the organisational hierarchy within BAA . At this point 
the project aim was the delivery of a terminal commensurate with its role as an 
international gateway to the United Kingdom, set within the BAA Board’s approved 
rates of return, and with the minimal possible environmental impact.  
The workshop identified a hierarchy of project risk by occurrence and impact into 
high, medium and low, and from this produced a project risk register, by which those 
risks affecting project out-turn were to be managed by: 
? Describing in qualitative terms giving the risk source, trigger events which could 
cause it to occur and the impact in term of cost/time/quality/environment and 
safety. 
? Detailing initial risk responses to major risk items. 
The mutual commitment of the group was ‘ensured’ by making participants aware of 
their equality, the validity of any opinion, and the importance of succinct precision 
and clarity. Hence the emphasis was upon defining the process and arriving at 
explicit aims and milestones. The facilitator’s role was to create an environment in 
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which the group utilises its members in terms of their technical knowledge and 
problem solving abilities. 
The work started by deconstructing the project into a series of five sub projects and 
focused on the technical and  financial issues using quantified measures covering 
cost, programme, environment, quality and safety. The majority of the participants 
had an accounting or engineering background. By deconstructing the project into 
‘manageable’ parts and dealing with those parts independently, the focus assumed 
the uncertainties to be faced were of a tame nature. This was akin to treating the 
problems as a game of roulette rather than a game of poker; absolutely rather than 
relationally. The analysis of the registers showed more discussion time was spent 
deliberating over the magnitude of probability and consequence than was spent 
considering possible response plans or the possibility that not all risks had been 
identified. The predominating assumption was that risk informa tion was most readily 
available from historic data. The facilitator adopted the role of summariser; 
consolidating opinions to points of solution whereby agreement was reached as to 
who was responsible for which risk. The risks themselves were described by each 
expert, and went largely unchallenged in discussion, and the workshops adopted the 
role of compiling these different risks into a workable schedule. The output was the 
compilation of an extensive risk schedule assessing the nature, occurrence, impact 
and ‘risk owner’ for over 350 risk descriptions. Table 2 shows the fifteen 
uncertainties from which T5 was considered most at risk.  
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Table 2: Top 15 risks from the earlier Project Risk Registers ranked in order of potential 
severity  
Late wish list from BA 
Impractical design causes problems with 
buildability 
Contractors go bust 
Delays with internal approval process 
Overheating of construction labour market 
Unforeseen ground conditions 
Vandalism to construction site buildings 
Failure of co-ordination between teams and 
with BAA 
Budget drives a reduction in design standards 
Inadequate site supervision e.g. Safety risk 
Container delivery to head of stand and 
between buildings 
Weather dependency of construction 
Lack of consultation with contractor on 
buildability issues 
Supplier under performance - Critical items 
being delivered late 
Off site rail head – Not possible  
No decision on rivers diversion 
 
Of the top fifteen identified risks, eleven could be described as tame (technical, 
financial or economic), with only the risk of variations, co-ordination problems, 
approval delays and vandalism touching upon complexities of behavioural or 
systems interdependency. Of these, ‘variations from ‘British Airways’ was cited as 
being the greatest risk facing the project, yet BA itself was not consulted nor became 
party to the workshop.  So even where a wicked mess was acknowledged, no attempt 
was made to evaluate it. Such a high proportion of ‘tame’ problem identification was 
all the more telling considering the capital works elements of the project had not 
even started, and so the emphasis was still upon strategy and planning rather than 
operations. 
The 2000 risk workshop 
During the intervening period, the project aims had been considerably simplified to a 
single sentence: “To develop the world’s most refreshing interchange delivered 
within cost and programme parameters, maximising shareholder value and respecting 
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last responsible moment to realise exceptional project performance”. The last 
responsible moment is defined as “the latest moment a decision can be made to finish 
the project to budget and programme without any compensating factors” (Lane and 
Woodward, 2000). Defining the last responsible moment forces project teams to 
reflect upon the limits of their understanding, and how what they do understand 
relates to the understandings of other teams The inclusion of last responsible moment 
meant the framing of the risk workshop changed from an emphasis upon delivering 
problem-solution coefficients to articulating those practices that afforded the project 
team the greatest space for reflection upon the nature of the problems they faced, 
before having to take a decision. This emphasis upon reflection and conversation 
meant it was considered critical to choose the participants based on their influence 
and ability to explore prevailing and emerging business issues. This meant that a 
considerable amount of time was spent with BAA and BA to ensure the ‘right’ 
people were present, along with general insurance and legal advisors, project 
suppliers and rail transport stakeholders. One of the problems with this approach is 
that the number of participants was more than would be considered ideal (10-12) and 
to help manage this successfully two assistants were employed.  
The workshop aims reflected this broader scope by looking to: 
? Link risk with opportunity and awareness of the associated tools and procedures; 
including secondary opportunity and risk identification 
? Be aware of team building criteria and competency gaps 
? Establish common ground within and between project teams 
A framework for the discussion had been designed using a questionnaire sent out 
before discussions, asking the participants to identify the five most significant risks 
and opportunities facing Terminal Five. This was used not only to identify areas of 
synergy or possible conflict, but also to indicate preconceptions brought to the 
discussion. Ground rules were again established, but there was a subtle change 
toward promoting conversation and critical reflection where people were of equal 
status, to regard feelings as important as fact, and to speculate rather than focus on 
precision. The more fluid aims meant the facilitator’s role required far greater 
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attention, and became a much more pro-active role of cha llenging received opinions 
and consensus as opposed to consolidating opinion and compiling conclusions. 
Specifically, the facilitator was to introduce different ways of looking at problems 
and to provide discourse structures leaving participants free to think. 
Where the previous conclusions had emphasized the need for a clear presentation of 
specific risks, now the participants were asked to consider devising enough space 
within project activity for teams to reflect upon the uncertainties they face, to 
consider possible innovations in the light of that space, and so to understand how 
risks could be converted into opportunities. Risk management became, in effect, a 
mode of project and team learning and knowledge management. The process aimed 
to replace the identification of reactive, fire- fighting activities with pro-active 
approaches by improving project team confidence, knowledge awareness and clear 
activity responsibility communicated through the life of the project. 
To these ends, discussions considered as much of what was not known as compiling 
what was. In addition, they subjected what was ‘known’ to thorough analysis, testing 
the presumptions brought to the table by the respective experts, and limiting the 
claims for this knowledge by refusing to elevate quantified risks above qualitative 
risks. The discussion was also concerned with enhancing the role of risk owners, 
considering them as risk ‘custodians’, responsible for the delivery of both work and 
the management of the risks attached to it.  
The results compiled in a register of the top risks facing the project represented a significant 
change in emphasis. Table 3 identifies the top fifteen. 
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Table 3: Top fifteen risks from the later Project Risk Registers in order of potential severity 
Not having clear lines of accountability/ responsibility, and clearly defined role of the 
client. 
Lack of Integration of IT/IM systems (Ownership, BA/BAA boundaries, timing, complexity 
of system, etc) 
Impact of adverse Foreign Currency Exchange rates on construction costs (approximately 
40% of £500m opportunity) 
Continuing "Business as usual" behaviour 
Skills shortages and labour shortages during construction 
Lack of integration of teams and people "kicking" against the use of integrated teams 
Inability to manage project changes (change control) 
Major 3rd party pieces of infrastructure on critical path for project not delivered on time 
(e.g. Iver South, M25 Spur, Highways Agency, Piccex LUL, Southern Electric  
Project disrupted through IR dispute 
Failure to integrate baggage into the project (and the project into baggage) 
Failure to secure regulatory regime to support viable T5 
Onerous conditions imposed by Public Inquiry Decision e.g.. Timing of Spur Road, Twin 
Rivers Diversions 
Risk management strategy fails due to inadequate or nil incentive fund 
Implications of Iver South not receiving planning consent resulting in need to maintain 
centrifuges at Perry Oaks for longer period (e.g. beyond commencement of Construction) 
Protestors action disrupts project 
 
Of these eleven can be considered as focussing upon issues of behavioural and 
systems interdependence (messes, wicked problems and wicked messes), and only 
four as ‘tame’. The hierarchy used in the register was not numerical, but colour 
coded, flattening the risk identification to red for high; amber for medium and green 
for low. This allowed participants’ judgements to be included without having them 
reduced to an algorithmic proxy. Where major disagreement occurred on the nature 
and importance of a risk, a discussion was held concerning the different perceptions 
of the risk. Using information from the questionnaire, as well as issues arising from 
the dialogue, the facilitator focussed the participants upon the relative positions and 
assumptions being adopted. Once these were stated clearly and understood, a 
satisfactory resolution of the differences could be worked on. 
The emphasis upon conversation and questioning meant that where in the fist 
workshops the tendency was to ‘dump’ into the risk register all the risks the experts 
could imagine, in the second the focus was upon how their experience related to the 
particulars of the Terminal Five project. Moreover, where the first workshops saw 
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responsibility as merely listing and ranking the risks, the second worked up risk 
‘custodian’ schedules that actively required individuals to be held accountable for 
their management throughout the project life. 
Conclusions  
The differences in the risk register workshop outcomes shows the influence that risk 
tools, techniques and presumptions have over the configuration of risk. By 
introducing the core rubric of tame, wicked and messy problems, risk management is 
far better placed to allow organizations to understand fully the gamut of risks they 
face, irrespective of their technical nature or otherwise. The investigation of the 
workshops has shown that risk management systems can underplay the importance of 
behavioural and system complexity considerations. The first workshops focussed 
upon technical aspects because of the makeup, the determining aims and the adoption 
of habitual risk perspectives. Using the experience of one of the authors within the 
second series, the research shows how by re-orienting workshop parameters to a less 
prescriptive level, and allowing greater scope in discourse, other aspects of risk will 
surface, and even come to predominate. Where the first emphasized a regimented, 
ordered structure toward conceptualising the exact components of risk, the second 
adopted more flexible patterns of determination, emphasising conversational 
exchange above tight structures. The difference in the outcomes arising from these 
differing emphases is stark. The emphasis of the first was upon attaching detailed 
solutions to specific largely technical problems. Each risk was linked to an identified 
risk owner whose responsibility was to find solutions to minimise exposure. In the 
second series, the participants were less formalized in the delivery of expert opinion, 
were more sensitive to how risk management could influence strategic decisions of 
the project directorate, and more focused upon using conversation to break down 
received opinions. This allowed an exploration of differing accounts of uncertainties 
arising from different sets of stakeholder perceptions, systems complexities and 
normative influence, enabling the risk schedules to reflect an awareness of the non-
technical aspects of risk definition. The evidence from that the second workshop 
approaching risk management as an activity of ‘satisficing’ suggests the search for 
optimal solutions can often be counterproductive, if it means excluding the 
perspectives and needs of others.   
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Terminal Five underwent an entire identity shift, from a technically constructed asset 
owned by a single company to a transport interchange invested in by many 
stakeholders. The effort and resources required to effect this change are significant. 
Organizationally, there has to be willingness to structure risk workshops with space 
sufficient to exploit the opportunities thrown up by risk whilst recognising the last 
responsible moment; the point at which a decision is taken. The challenge is to 
ensure participants have sufficient time to become aware of the nature of non-tame 
problems, and the competency and responsibility to operate with the persisting 
uncertainties that these entail. This requires involvement from different levels and 
cultures (executive culture, engineering culture, operational or administrative 
culture) (Schein, 1996) within the project environment, meaning risk workshops 
operate at a strategic level in close proximity to the project directorate. Without this 
project rapport, the benefits of understanding the risks associated with systems 
integration and human behaviour will be sidelined as a subset of technical 
constraints, and be left to configure themselves as potentially harmful events. 
Configuring where upon the matrix of tame, wicked and messy a problem lies is only 
a valid investment if the resultant register is then integrated fully into overall project 
strategy.  
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